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,QWURGXFWLRQ
 
Electoral systems are according to the classic definition of Rae (1967: 14) rules ‘which 
govern the processes by which electoral preferences are articulated as votes and by which 
these votes are translated into distributions of governmental authority (typically 
parliamentary seats) among the competing political parties’ This translation from votes 
into seats is far from neutral. The choice for a particular electoral system can have far-
reaching consequences for the composition of a local council or a parliament. Three basic 
variables are important in this respect: ballot structure, district magnitude and electoral 
formula (Rae, 1967 ; Lijphart, 1994). 
The EDOORWVWUXFWXUH consists of three aspects (Van der Kolk, 2003): the number of votes a 
voter is allowed to cast, the type of information a voter can give (nominal, ordinal or 
numerical) and whether voters can vote for parties, for individuals or for both. The 
GLVWULFWPDJQLWXGH can be measured by dividing the number of seats by the number of 
districts (Taagepera & Shugart, 1989). The HOHFWRUDOIRUPXOD refers to the way votes are 
translated into seats: there are three main types: a majoritarian system with an absolute 
majority ('majority system'), a majoritarian system with a relative majority ('plurality 
system') en a system of proportional representation (‘PR system’). Besides these main 
types, there are intermediary systems which combine elements of PR systems and 
majoritarian systems. 
 
We will focus in this article on the preferential vote, which is part of the ballot structure. 
The analysis will be restricted to PR list systems. Preferential voting, i.e. the possibility to 
vote for candidates, differs enormously between countries using PR (Van der Kolk, 
2003). The type of electoral list, a crucial variable in this respect, refers to the main 
distinction between closed and open lists. Some PR systems allow voters to express their 
preferences for political parties only. Such systems are named closed list systems: the 
seats obtained by a party are automatically allocated to the candidates according to the 
list order as determined by the party. Other PR systems give voters the opportunity to 
change the list order put forward by political parties by allowing them to cast a 
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preferential vote for one or more candidates of the same party. In such an open list 
system, voters choose between individual candidates of a party. Seats are allocated 
according to the number of preferential votes obtained by the candidates. The voters 
decide who will be elected.  
In practice, however, many mixed systems exist: preferential votes play a partial role in 
determining who is elected, together with other considerations such as the list order 
(Karvonen, 2004). Some of these systems resemble more open-list systems, while others 
look more like closed-list systems. Whether they can be situated towards one pole or 
another is in some systems legally determined, while in other systems this depends upon 
the percentage of voters that cast a preferential vote. The latter is in particular the case for 
‘flexible lists’  (Marsh, 1985), where voters have the choice between supporting the list or 
voting for one or more preferred candidates. The candidates at the top of the list receive 
in such a system list votes in addition to their own preferential votes, which increases 
their chance to become elected. Where the percentage of preferential votes is low, the 
number of list votes to distribute is large and consequently, the list order is often decisive. 
In such a situation, the system resembles a closed-list system. In elections where the 
percentage of preferential voters is high, the number of list votes to distribute is limited, 
and as a consequence, the system will tend to be more like an open-list system (Wauters, 
2000). The number of voters casting a preferential vote has thus a tremendous impact on 
who will be elected, but also on who is the main decision-maker in this process: parties or 
voters. In this way, this topic can be linked to recent discussions about a more 
personalised style of politics at the local level as a way of recovering the relation between 
citizens and politicians (Kersting, 2005). Due to a decline of the linkage function of 
(local) political parties, the gap between voters and local politicians has increased. It is 
believed that giving more weight to individual voters and individual politicians, at the 
expense of parties, could improve this relationship. Preferential votes play a crucial role 
in this tendency towards a more personalised style of politics. It could serve as a 
guarantee for a strong link between voters and politicians. Majoritarian systems produce, 
due to their small electoral districts, automatically a form of linkage between the elected 
and the electors. PR systems, which are by definition organised in larger districts, often 
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lack such a connection. A system of preferential voting in a PR system could, however, 
help to overcome this problem.  
 
Preferential votes do not only matter directly in determining who is elected, as was 
illustrated above, but also impacts indirectly on the composition of the local government. 
Research has revealed that for 80 % of the local parties in Flanders the number of 
preferential votes serves as an important criterion to designate executive positions in local 
government (Ackaert, 1996). A candidate who obtains a large number of votes has a good 
chance to become mayor or alderman. Consequently, in municipalities where many 
voters cast a preferential vote, they could also have an indirect, but substantial impact on 
the composition of the local government. 
Preferential voting also plays an important role in maintaining and fostering crucial 
values for the democratic functioning of a political system. A comparative analysis has 
shown that systems with preferential voting promote a greater sense of fairness about 
election outcomes among voters than systems without preferential voting. This sense of 
fairness is an important component of the citizen satisfaction with the democratic system 
(Farrell & McAllister, 2006).  
 
Despite the importance of preferential voting for the democratic functioning of (local) 
authorities, research attention for this topic has been limited. Preferential voting is often 
(but only briefly) mentioned in the literature as part of the broader electoral system, but 
the number of studies on preferential voting as a separate topic are scarce (Katz, 1986 ; 
Karvonen, 2004). It is revealing in this respect to note that different terms1 are used to 
denote this phenomenon: preferential voting, personal voting, person voting, preference 
vote and intraparty choice (Karvonen, 2004). This probably also hampered (comparative) 
research on this topic. 
Moreover, most of the time, attention is mainly focused upon the possible effects of a 
system of preferential voting on variables such as  government stability, factionalism, 
campaign financing, legislative turn-over and the presence of underrepresented groups 
                                                 
1
 This phenomenon should, however, not be confused with the ‘personal vote’ , which is a term reserved for 
the study of candidates in single-member constituencies. 
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(Karvonen, 2004 ; Matland, 2005). Other approaches aim to define and classify systems 
of preferential voting in comparative perspective (Marsh, 1985 ; Van der Kolk, 2007).  
In this article, we will study the factors stimulating the use of preferential votes. Research 
on the effect of factors influencing casting a preferential vote is underdeveloped (Van der 
Kolk, 2003). Since the exact meaning of preferential voting differs considerably accros 
countries, comparative research may not be very helpful in studying the causes for 
casting a prefential vote (Van der Kolk, 2003). Therefore, our analysis is an in-depth 
study of preferential voting in local elections in one single region (Flanders, a region of 
Belgium). This allows us to take a large number of explanatory variables into account. 
More in particular, we will analyse in what kind of Flemish municipalities voters are 
more likely to cast preferential votes. 
Before setting out the research hypotheses, we will describe the local electoral system in 
Flanders (Belgium). 
 
3UHIHUHQWLDOYRWHVDWWKHORFDOOHYHOLQ%HOJLXP
 
A Belgian voter has the choice between casting a preferential vote for one or more 
candidates (on a single party list) and casting a list vote. This kind of list system can be 
named a ‘flexible list system’  (Marsh, 1985) or a ‘weak preferential voting in list system’  
(Karvonen, 2004). Candidates with a number of preferential votes attaining the threshold 
of eligibility are generally speaking automatically elected. The other candidates can make 
use of the list votes in order to reach the threshold. These list votes are distributed to the 
candidates according to the list order. As a consequence, the candidates at the top of the 
list have a substantial advantage, as a result of which the system for a long time 
functioned as a de facto closed list system, especially at the national level. For local 
elections, where the social distance between voters and elected is small, the percentage of 
voters casting a preferential vote has always been high, resulting in a relatively high 
number of candidates elected out of the list order (Wauters, 2000 ; Ackaert et al, 2007). 
The local electoral system has always resembled more an open-list system. 
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In order to enhance the impact of preferential votes in national and regional elections, a 
recent electoral reform halved the impact of the list votes on the allocation of the seats, as 
a result of which the advantage of higher ranked candidates was weakened (Wauters, 
2003). Belgium has thus evolved in practice from a semi-closed list PR system to a semi-
open list PR system. Also for elections at the local level in Flanders, where the impact of 
preferential votes was nevertheless already high, new electoral laws halving the transfer 
of list votes and eventually taking only one third of the list votes2 were adopted (Decree 
of 7 July 2006 concerning adaptations on the Local Electoral Decree).  
Local elections are held every six years. The most recent local elections were held in 
2006, 2000 and 1994. The power of the preferential vote has undergone changes over 
these elections: in 1994, the total number of list votes was transferred according to the list 
order, while in 2006 still only one third of these votes were used. The power of a 
preferential vote, and hence the incentive to cast one, has thus increased. It is one of the 
aims of the article to investigate the impact of  these institutional changes on voting 
behavior (whether or not casting a preferential vote). 
 
5HVHDUFKTXHVWLRQV
 
In this paper, an analysis on the macro-level will be conducted: characteristics of local 
communities will be linked to preferential voting on the level of a local community. Our 
analysis will be twofold. We will first look at the situation in 2006 and the variables that 
could explain the share of preferential votes. Our dependent variable here is the 
percentage of the voters that have cast a preferential vote, calculated on the total number 
of voters in a municipality.  
Secondly, the impact of the change in electoral laws will be evaluated by looking at the 
difference in the share of preferential votes between 1994 and 2006. The difference 
between the two percentages (1994 and 2006) will serve as dependent variable.  
 
Five groups of independent variables will be brought into the analysis: 
                                                 
2
 In fact, the number of list votes per party is multiplied by the number of seats per party (as was done 
before), and then divided by three. 
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6RFLRGHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV: age, social class, gender and ethnic origin 
 
Marsh (1985) approaches preferential voting with instruments to analyse participation 
behaviour. The resource theory states that participation depends upon the ‘resources’  one 
has (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978). Resources include among others money, education, time, 
civic engagement and access to political information. Some members are better equipped 
than others to participate. From several studies, it appears that in general women, young 
(or conversely rather old) people, non-white people and people from lower socio-
economic classes often lack these vital resources, and as a consequence participate less in 
political activities. Marsh states that these variables also influence negatively the chance 
to cast a preferential vote. On the contrary, we should look also at research that has 
shown that ethnic minority candidates and candidates of lower social classes have a 
higher chance to become elected in areas where their social group has a large 
concentration in the population (Anwar, 2001). Preferential voting for candidates of these 
underpriveleged groups could be seen as a strategy to enhance their representation. 
Consequently, preferential voting could be more extensive in communities where 
members of such underprivileged groups are numerous, which is the opposite expectation 
of the resource theory.  Moreover, foreigners were (within certain conditions) for the 
2006 local election for the first time allowed to vote. They had, unlike Belgian voters, to 
register themselves as voter. It is not unthinkable that these citizens demonstrate by their 
personal registration a larger degree of political commitment and develop a clearer view 
on politics and politicians and that by consequence they incline more to use the 
preferential vote. 
Variables typically associated with particaption levels, such as age, social status, gender 
and ethnic origin, will be included in the analysis. Earlier research has already 
investigated the effect of some of these variables on the individual level. As for age, Van 
der Kolk (2003) found that younger and older people cast less a preferential vote than 
people between 30 and 50 years old. The evidence about the effect of gender on 
preferential voting yields, however, a mixed picture: in Denmark and Norway, men use 
preferential voting more than women, while in the Netherlands, women use preferential 
8 
 
voting more often (Van der Kolk, 2003). We should note that contrary to the studies 
described above, the effect of these variables will be tested here on the macro level. 
 
3ROLWLFDOYDULDEOHV: number of parties, ideology of parties and presence of local parties  
 
As set out earlier, preferential voting offers an extra choice above the choice a voter has 
between parties. We hypothesize here that when the choice between parties is limited in a 
local community, because only a few parties are putting forward candidate lists, voters 
will make more extensively use of preferential voting. By making a choice between 
candidates, a voter can still make his preferences known despite the limited choice 
between parties.  
Also the effect of the ideology of the major parties in a local community will be analysed. 
In general, preferential voting seems to be more common amongst right-wing parties than 
amongst left-wing parties (Hessing, 1985 ; Wauters & Weekers, 2008), but evidence 
differs here from one country to another (Marsh, 1985). It can also be hypothesized that 
rather new parties and parties that are mainly waging a party campaign instead of 
individual campaigns (mainly green and extreme right parties) (Weekers & Maddens, 
2009), are more likely to attract fewer preferential votes, and consequently that 
municipalities where these parties perform well in elections will exhibit lower 
percentages of preferential votes.  
A final aspect of the political variables is constituted by the presence of local lists. These 
local lists represent a broad range of parties not operating under the heading of a national 
party at the local elections. Despite their diversity, they share some characteristics: local 
parties are in general less structured, less ideologically outspoken, more oriented towards 
municipal issues and give local notables (often known from the local associational life) a 
more prominent position on their candidate lists (Steyvers et al, 2008). Consequently, it 
could be expected that local lists attract more preferential votes, and that municipalities 
with a large share of local lists will have a higher percentage of preferential voting. 
 
6RFLDOFDSLWDOYDULDEOHV: number of associations 
 
Two components of social capital can be distinguished: structural and cultural components 
(Putnam, 2000). One structural element of social capital that is relevant here is the associational 
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life of a community. Voluntary organizations based on membership can be seen as ‘schools of 
democracy’  where social and civic skills are learnt. Moreover, voluntary organizations play an 
important role in the recruitment of candidates. We hypothesize that a flourishing associational 
life increases the chance that people are aware of the value of a preferential vote (political 
education) and that candidates tend to be better known to a large share of the electorate. The 
associational life of a community is measured by the number of voluntary associations at the local 
level as proxy. The choice for this indicator is based on practical and substantive reasons. Recent 
data on the number of associations at the local level in Flanders are available (Lauwereysen & 
Colpaert, 2004). Moreover, this proxy serves as a particularly good indicator for social capital as 
the formal voluntary association is the most important form of horizontal interaction and 
reciprocity.  
 
*HRJUDILFYDULDEOHV: population density and number of inhabitants 
 
Studies contradict each other as to whether an urban or a rural environment is beneficial 
for attracting a large share of preferential voters (Marsh, 1985). For Belgium, however, it 
has been shown that for the local elections, there is a straightforward relationship 
between the population density and the percentage of preferential votes of a municipality: 
the more urban a municipality, the less preferential votes (Wauters, 200). This 
relationship was explained by the concept of ‘social distance’ : in rural communities 
politicians are more close to the population than in large cities, and hence people are 
more likely to cast a preferential vote for these locally well-known candidates. 
 
 
In a second step, the effect of the electoral reforms giving more weight to preferential 
votes will be investigated: have they led to an increase in the use of preferential votes, 
and if so, in what kind of local communities more than in other? The increase or decrease 
in the percentages of voters casting a preferential vote is here the dependent variable.  
The investigation over time of the effect of the electoral reform can be linked to the 
influence of LQVWLWXWLRQDO YDULDEOHV, a fifth group of explanatory variables. The most 
obvious incentive to cast a preferential vote is, in Marsh’  (1985) view, the expectation 
that this kind of vote will affect the distribution of seats. It seems logic that when the 
impact of list votes is diminished by electoral reforms and as a consequence the weight 
given to preferential votes grows, the percentages of voters casting a preferential vote 
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will increase. It will be investigated whether this indeed occurs by comparing the 
percentages of preferential votes between the local elections of 1994, where the total 
number of list voters is transferred to candidates according to the list order and those of 
2006, where only one third of the list votes is transferred. 
 
 
5HVXOWV
 
%LYDULDWHDQDO\VHVIRUWKHHOHFWLRQV
 
We will start by investigating the bivariate relationships between the percentage of 
preferential votes and a large number of variables that can be catalogued under one of the 
groups of variables discussed in the previous section.  
As for the socio-demographic variables, our results show that municipalities with a rather 
old and female population tend to exhibit a lower percentage of preferential votes. This is 
line with the ‘resource theory’ . The share of foreigners and the share of young people in 
the population does not have a significant effect, however. The analysis on socio-
economic variables yields a mixed picture: the share of social housing in a municipality 
correlates with the percentage preferential votes, while the long-term employment rate 
does not (not in table). 
 
7DEOH%LYDULDWHUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQYDULDEOHVDQGWKHSHUFHQWDJHRI
SUHIHUHQWLDOYRWHVLQRQWKHOHYHORIWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\1 
 
 R P 
6RFLRGHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV   
   Percentage 18-64 years old .121* 0.033 
   Percentage younger than 35 years old .050 0.379 
   Percentage older than 65 years old -.150** 0.009 
   Percentage older than 80 years old -.151** 0.008 
   Percentage women -.419** 0.000 
   Percentage foreigners .081 0.157 
   Share of social housing -.140* 0.014 
   
3ROLWLFDOYDULDEOHV   
   Number of parties in elections -.444** 0.000 
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   Percentage of CD&V-N-VA .056 0.327 
   Percentage of Sp.a-Spirit -.133* 0.020 
   Percentage of OpenVLD -.139* 0.015 
   Percentage of Vlaams Belang -.499** 0.000 
   Percentage of Groen! -.192** 0.001 
   Vote percentage for local lists .253** 0.000 
   
6RFLDOFDSLWDOYDULDEOHV   
   Number of associations per 1000 inhabit. .392** 0.000 
   
*HRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV   
   Number of inhabitants -.281** 0.000 
   Population density -.453** 0.000 
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 
 
Secondly, almost all political variables significantly correlate with the percentage of 
preferential votes. Both the number of parties and the type of parties are related to 
preferential voting as measured on the local level. As for this second element, the vote 
shares of the extreme right Vlaams Belang and the ecologist party Groen! shows, as 
expected, the strongest (negative) correlation with the percentage of preferential votes. 
As for the vote share of local lists, there also is a significant correlation. 
Thirdly, also the number of associations, as proxy for social capital, correlates 
significantly with the percentage of preferential votes. This confirms the social capital 
hypothesis. 
Finally, all demographic variables included in the analysis have a significant negative 
relationship with the use of preferential voting: the more urban a municipality, the less 
preferential votes are cast. 
 
0XOWLYDULDWHDQDO\VLV
 
As it seems that many variables from the explanatory framework are correlated with each 
other, it is advisable to run a multivariate analysis. 
 
 
7DEOH0XOWLYDULDWHUHJUHVVLRQPRGHOZLWKWKHSHUFHQWDJHRISUHIHUHQWLDOYRWHVLQ
RQWKHOHYHORIWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\DVGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH
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 B Std. error Beta P 
&RQVWDQW 111.424 28.275  .000 
     
6RFLRGHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV     
   Percentage 18-64 years old .288 .155 .104 .063 
   Percentage women -80.878 42.613 -.122 .059 
   Percentage foreigners 23.593 5.522 .206 .000 
   Share of social housing -10.244 7.839 -.063 .192 
     
3ROLWLFDOYDULDEOHV     
   Number of parties in elections -.448 .237 -.134 .060 
   Percentage of CD&V-N-VA -.008 .060 -.029 .889 
   Percentage of Sp.a-Spirit -.003 .061 -.007 .961 
   Percentage of OpenVLD -.028 .062 -.070 .652 
   Percentage of Vlaams Belang -.162 .067 -.248 .015 
   Percentage of Groen! -.064 .079 -.054 .413 
   Percentage of local parties -.004 .059 -.022 .946 
     
6RFLDOFDSLWDOYDULDEOHV     
   Number of associations per 1000 
inhabit. .952 .268 .200 .000 
     
*HRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV     
   Number of inhabitants .000 .000 -.022 .703 
   Population density -.002 .001 -.155 .012 
$GM5ð S1 

This multivariate analysis shows that four variables significantly affect the percentage of 
preferential votes in a municipality (one from each category of variables: the percentage 
of foreigners, the vote percentage of the extreme right Vlaams Belang, the number of 
associations and the population density). The latter three are in line with the bivariate 
analyses, but the strong significant effect of the share of foreigners in the population 
comes as a surprise, since there was no significant effect in the bivariate analysis. We do 
not have a straightforward explanation for this phenomenon, except maybe a sort of 
compensation effect for urban areas . 
We should note that the effects of the percentage of women, the percentage of 18-64 
years old and the number of parties are only slightly non-significant at 0.05-level. 
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7KHHIIHFWRIWKHHOHFWRUDOUHIRUPVELYDULDWHDQDO\VHV
 
Here, the impact of the electoral reforms will be assessed. Between 1994 and 2006, 
electoral reforms enhancing the impact of preferential voting were adopted (first halving 
and eventually taking only one third of the list votes for the distribution of seats).  
 
7DEOH7KHSHUFHQWDJHRISUHIHUHQWLDOYRWHVDQGWKHDYHUDJHQXPEHURI
SUHIHUHQWLDOYRWHVLQDQGPHDQVDQGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQ
 
 <HDU 1 0HDQ 6WDQGDUG
GHYLDWLRQ
1994 308 84.36 7.39 Percentage 
preferential votes 2006 307 85.63 5.30 
 
As can be seen from Table 3 the general effect on the average percentage of preferential 
votes has not been tremendous: only a slight increase (from 84,36 % to 85,63 %) could be 
noted. This is confirmed by a correlation coefficient of 0.597 between the percentages of 
preferential votes on the municipal level in 1994 and 2006 (not in the table). 
The rather marked drop in the standard deviation between 1994 and 2006, however, 
seems to suggest that the electoral reforms have rendered the preferential vote 
percentages across municipalities more equal. It seems plausible to assume that in 
municipalities with low percentages of preferential votes these percentages have 
increased between 1994 and 2006, while in municipalities with high percentages they 
have remained stable or have witnessed a slight decrease. Whether this is indeed so will 
be investigated in the subsequent analysis. 
 
7DEOH%LYDULDWHUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQYDULDEOHVDQGWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQWKH
SHUFHQWDJHRISUHIHUHQWLDOYRWHVEHWZHHQDQGRQWKHOHYHORIWKH
PXQLFLSDOLW\1 
 
 R P 
6RFLRGHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV   
   Percentage 18-64 years old -.028 0.619 
   Percentage younger than 35 years old .203** 0.000 
   Percentage older than 65 years old -.154** 0.007 
   Percentage older than 80 years old -.120* 0.036 
   Percentage women .144* 0.011 
   Percentage foreigners .384** 0.000 
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   Share of social housing .191** 0.001 
   
3ROLWLFDOYDULDEOHV   
   Number of parties in elections .228** 0.000 
   Percentage of CD&V-N-VA -.075 0.189 
   Percentage of Sp.a-Spirit -.038 0.506 
   Percentage of OpenVLD -.048 0.404 
   Percentage of Vlaams Belang .290** 0.000 
   Percentage of Groen! .189** 0.001 
   Number of local lists in elections -.028 0.625 
   
6RFLDOFDSLWDOYDULDEOHV   
   Number of associations per 1000 inhabit. -.238** 0.000 
   
*HRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV   
   Number of inhabitants .238** 0,000 
   Population density .369** 0.000 
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01 
 
The bivariate analyses in Table 4 (comparison 1994-2006) show in general the opposite 
picture of Table 1 (2006). This implies that in municipalities where the percentage of 
preferential votes is already high, the effect of the electoral reform is limited. The largest 
increase could be noted in localities where the percentage of preferential votes was rather 
low in 1994. There is, for instance, a negative correlation between number of associations 
and the evolution in preferential voting. This means that in municipalities where the 
number of associations is high, the percentage of preferential votes is already high (as 
was shown in Table 1) and there was no room for a further large increase. Conversely, in 
municipalities with only a few number of associations, the percentage of preferential 
voting is low, and hence the effect of the electoral reform is rather large. 
An exception to this reverse pattern is formed by the share of older people in the 
population: this correlates negatively with both the percentage as such as with the 
evolution of the percentage of preferential votes. Perhaps, older people are less informed 
about these reforms or are less familiar with the practice of (electronic) preferential 
voting. Also the percentage of foreigners in the population correlates positively with both 
the percentage in 2006 and the evolution of this percentage (albeit the former correlation 
is not significant). 
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7KHHIIHFWRIWKHHOHFWRUDOUHIRUPVPXOWLYDULDWHDQDO\VHV
 
 
7DEOH0XOWLYDULDWHUHJUHVVLRQPRGHOZLWKWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHSHUFHQWDJHRI
SUHIHUHQWLDOYRWHVEHWZHHQDQGRQWKHOHYHORIWKHPXQLFLSDOLW\DV
GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH1 
 
 B Std. error Beta P 
&RQVWDQW 55.003 35.744  .125 
     
6RFLRGHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV     
   Percentage 18-64 years old -.203 .195 -.065 .299 
   Percentage women -85.246 53.871 -.114 .115 
   Percentage foreigners 39.411 6.981 .306 .000 
   Share of social housing 8.204 9.910 .045 .408 
     
3ROLWLFDOYDULDEOHV     
   Number of parties in elections -.011 .300 -.003 .971 
   Percentage of CD&V-N-VA -.018 .076 -.056 .810 
   Percentage of Sp.a-Spirit -.071 .077 -.140 .359 
   Percentage of OpenVLD -.030 .078 -.067 .699 
   Percentage of Vlaams Belang .094 .084 .127 .264 
   Percentage of Groen! .201 .099 .149 .044 
   Percentage of local parties -.023 .074 -.112 .756 
     
6RFLDOFDSLWDOYDULDEOHV     
   Number of associations per 1000 
inhabit. -.214 .339 -.040 .528 
     
*HRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV     
   Number of inhabitants .000 .000 .042 .519 
   Population density .003 .001 .234 .001 
$GM5ð S1 
 
 
Here again the percentage of foreigners in a local population significantly affects the 
increase in the percentage of people casting a preferential vote and once again, we do not 
have a direct straightforward explanation. A factor that could be relevant in this respect is 
that foreigners were granted in 2006 for the first time the right to vote in elections in 
Belgium. Perhaps, these new voters, less familiar with Belgian parties, have casted a 
preferential vote. Also the fact that foreigners had to register, and consequently mainly 
motivated and well-informed voters could vote, could be an explanation for this. 
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The population density also impacts on our dependent variable: the more urban a 
municipality, the larger the effect on preferential voting of the electoral reforms. It seems 
that the electoral reforms has had most effect in cities, while they were rather superfluous 
in more rural municipalities because the share of preferential voting was already high 
there. 
The vote shares of two smaller, new parties (extreme right Vlaams Belang and the 
ecologist Groen!) have an influence on the percentages of preferential voting. This effect 
is probably not only due to the electoral reform, but could also be well explained by the 
increasing professionalization and personalization of these parties that become more and 
more established. Also a similar reasoning as above could be made: these are parties with 
a very low share of preferential votes, and consequently, there was more room for an 
increase than among other more traditional parties. 
 
 
&RQFOXVLRQ
 
Preferential voting has not yet extensively investigated as a separate research object. This 
phenomenon is important, however, since it determines for instance whether a flexible 
list system, as is used in Belgium, functions rather as an open list-system or as a closed-
list system. It could also be related to the efforts to introduce a more personalized style of 
politics. 
In this paper, we have investigated in what kind of municipalities voters are more likely 
to cast a preferential vote and whether the electoral reform granting the voters more 
power had an effect in what kind of municipalities. 
We have put forward four groups of variables that could explain both the actual 
percentage of preferential votes at the municipal level and the evolution of this 
percentage as influenced by the electoral reforms. These groups were socio-demographic 
variables, political variables, social capital variables and geographic variables. Our 
analysis shows that variables from each group correlate significantly with the percentage 
of preferential votes (even in a multivariate analysis). The comparison between 1994 and 
2006 often yields the reverse picture: characteristics of municipalities that have a positive 
17 
 
effect on the percentage of preferential votes, have a negative impact upon the evolution 
between 1994 and 2006, and vice versa. This results in the electoral reform having only 
an outspoken marked effect in urban municipalities, because elsewhere local politics is 
already to a large extent personalized by locally known politicians. In these rural 
municipalities the electoral reform was superfluous. 
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$SSHQGL[

Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis 
 
9DULDEOHQDPH 1 0HDQ 6WDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQ
Percentage preferential votes 2006 307 85,63 5,30 
Percentage preferential votes 1994 308 84,36 7,39 
    
6RFLRGHPRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV    
Percentage 18-64 years old 307 62.30 1.92 
Percentage younger than 35 years old 307 40.27 2.35 
Percentage older than 65 years old 307 17.52 2.21 
Percentage older than 80 years old 307 4.22 0.89 
Percentage women 307 50.46 0.80 
Percentage foreigners 307 3.47 4.64 
Share of social housing 307 4.02 3.25 
Share of long-term unemployment 307 1.31 0.51 
    
3ROLWLFDOYDULDEOHV    
Number of parties in elections 308 4.76 1.58 
Number of parties in the local council 308 4.15 1.07 
Percentage of CD&V-N-VA3 308 30.63 18.51 
Percentage of Sp.a-Spirit 308 9.72 11.77 
Percentage of OpenVLD 308 13.87 13.30 
Percentage of Vlaams Belang 308 10.55 8.07 
Percentage of Groen! 308 2.63 4.43 
Vote percentage for local lists 308 31.59 28.91 
Number of national parties in elections 308 3.24 1.57 
Number of local lists in elections 308 1.52 1.13 
    
6RFLDOFDSLWDOYDULDEOHV    
Number of associations per 1000 inhabit. 307 2,62 1,11 
    
*HRJUDSKLFYDULDEOHV    
Number of registered voters 308 15091.30 22746.39 
Number of councilors 308 23.89 6.25 
Number of inhabitants 307 19696.08 31524.30 
Population density 307 521.30 448.70 
 
                                                 
3
 The means of the percentages of the parties are calculated on the basis of the percentages of these parties 
by municipality. Consequently, these means do not correspond to the overall score of parties as calculated  
over  the whole region.   
